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This article assesses the Conservative-led Coalition Government’s (2010–2015)
record on benefit sanctions and work-for-your-benefit (workfare) policies. It is
argued that while the schemes largely built upon previous Labour Governments’
(1997–2010) policies, the Coalition Government also switched back to a traditional
Conservative discourse, according to which jobseekers are part of a “work-shy”
minority who live at the expense of the “hard working” taxpaying majority. The
crackdown on unemployment benefits was broadly popular with the public, which
explains why the Coalition Government was able to implement a relatively harsh
benefit sanctions regime. Work-for-your-benefit policies, by contrast, were faced
with a series of political and legal challenges.
Introduction
Based on original research involving documentary analysis and interviews with
policymakers, this article analyses the evolution of contemporary welfare to work
schemes in the UKwith a particular emphasis on work-for-your-benefit (workfare)
schemes and benefit sanctions for the unemployed. These policies revolve around
the centrality of sanctions for ensuring that claimants are available for work,
actively look for work and comply with the requirements imposed by public
employment services. Labour Governments (1997–2010) endorsed a work-first
approach, according to which jobseekers should access the paid labour market as
quickly as possible, and also stepped up benefit sanctions. To a large extent, the
Coalition Government (2010–2015) built upon previous Labour policies, but it
also used an aggressive rhetoric according to which the unemployed, characterised
as the undeserving poor, have no legitimate claims on the public purse. The
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Iain Duncan Smith MP—who was
reappointed in May 2015 after the victory of the Conservatives in the May 2015
general election—has switched back to a traditional Conservative discourse,
according to which jobseekers are part of a “work-shy” minority who live at the
expense of the hard-working taxpaying majority. This narrative has been at the
heart of the Conservative Party rhetoric on the unemployed and social security
since the 1980s. For instance, in 1987 the Conservative Secretary of State for
Social Security, John Moore MP, justified targeted social spending on those in
greatest need in these terms:
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“The indiscriminate handing out of benefits not only spreads limited resources
too thinly, it can also undermine the will to self-help, and builds pools of
resentment among the taxpayers who are footing the bill, often from incomes
barely larger from the money benefit recipients receive. By targeting our
welfare resources we will be able to provide more real help where need is
greatest.”1
Iain Duncan Smith MP has adopted a similar divide-and-rule rhetoric, pitching
“hard working taxpayers” against “people on tax credits and benefits”.2
This article is divided into four sections. First, it presents the evolution of welfare
to work policies in a historical perspective (from 1942), with a brief characterisation
of the contractarianmodel of welfare endorsed by successive Labour Governments
(1997–2010). Secondly, it analyses the rationale for introducing new benefit
sanctions for recipients of jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) under the Welfare Reform
Act 2012. Thirdly, it presents the evolution of work-for-your-benefit schemes
under the Conservative-led Coalition Government. Finally, it assesses the Coalition
Government’s record on welfare to work policies for JSA claimants between 2010
and 2015.
The sections on benefit sanctions and workfare schemes draw upon the research
findings regarding the evolution of the Coalition Government’s policies between
2010 and 2015. The objective of the research was to identify the legal and political
arguments as well as the twists and turns in the decision-making process
surroundingworkfare and benefit sanctions schemes. The research used a qualitative
case-study approach based on documentary analysis as well as approximately 25
semi-directed interviews with senior civil servants from the Department for Work
and Pensions (DWP), members of the House of Commons Work and Pensions
Select Committee (2010–2015), members of the Joint Committee on HumanRights
in the House of Lords as well as members of the Social Security Advisory
Committee (SSAC). The interview schedule included questions regarding the
evolution of workfare schemes, as well as questions regarding the degree of political
consensus between Labour and Coalition Government actors (with an assessment
of Labour and Coalition Government policies).
Welfare to work policies in historical perspective
The UK represents a hybrid model of welfare that combines liberal and
social-democratic elements.3 In practice, especially since the 1980s, the country
has increasingly endorsed a liberal model of welfare that provides relatively low
unemployment benefits and relies extensively on targeted means-tested social
assistance.4
1 John Moore MP, Secretary of State for Social Security, Conservative Party political conference, speech of
September 26, 1987, Conservative Party News, quoted by D.King, Actively seeking work? (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1995), p.180.
2 I. Duncan Smith wrote in theDaily Telegraph in 2012: “This Government is on the side of hard-working taxpayers,
the people across the country working in the private and public sectors who have seen their pay frozen or cut, as
businesses have struggled to keep them in work. And all the while these people have watched those on tax credits or
benefits see their income rise, outstripping their earnings.” “We’ve brought back fairness to welfare”,Daily Telegraph,
December 30, 2012.
3A. Cochrane, J. Clarke and S. Gerwitz, Comparing Welfare States, 2nd edn (Sage, 2001).
4G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 1st edn (Polity Press, 1989).
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The history of the welfare state in the UK has been characterised by a permanent
tension between universalist principles, according to which individuals are entitled
to protection against a wide range of social risks, such as unemployment, ill health
and age, as well as selectivity principles, whereby individuals can only have access
to social protection when they satisfy certain eligibility criteria (particularly to be
below a certain level of income) and behavioural requirements (such as being
actively looking for work). The universalist model of welfare is best defined by
Marshall,5 who portrayed the social rights of citizenship as involving “an absolute
right to a certain standard of civilisation which is conditional only on the discharge
of the general duties of citizenship”.6 Social rights meant that everyone should
have access to a minimum standard of living in order to be fully able to exercise
his or her civil and political rights.7
This universalist vision was at the heart of the modern British welfare state
established by William Beveridge, who stated the Government’s duty to provide
for social security. One of the guiding principles of the Beveridge Report was
co-operation between the state and the citizen:
“The third principle is that social security must be achieved by cooperation
between the State and the individual. The State should offer security for
service and contribution.”8
Beveridge had expected citizens to rely mostly on national insurance contributions
with the advent of a full employment society. National insurance was intended to
deal with marginal employment, including casual labour, seasonal work and
short-time working. Means-tested social assistance (“National Assistance”) was
seen as a subsidiary scheme to social security, which would naturally disappear
over time. However, this did not happen. Indeed, as unemployment benefit was
of limited duration (12 months), many people fell through the insurance system,
especially as the value of unemployment benefits fell below subsistence levels in
the 1950s. In the 1960s, the rediscovery of poverty coupled with problems of low
take up of National Assistance and stigma contributed to the creation in 1966 of
the Supplementary Benefit scheme, administered by the Supplementary Benefits
Commission (SBC). Instead of strengthening the insurance principle that had been
at the heart of Beveridge’s vision, the Labour Government chose to expand social
assistance. This represented a historical point of departure that would prove very
difficult to reverse. As a result, unemployment insurance coverage had been
especially low in Britain since the mid-1960s. As mass unemployment grew in
the 1970s and 1980s, more people came to rely on means-tested benefits, with a
clear acceleration in the decline in coverage of contributory unemployment benefits:
“In the early 1980s, unemployment benefit was available only to a minority
in the UK: in 1983 thirty two percent of unemployed people received
unemployment benefits, and this fell to 23 per cent in 1993.”9
5T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and social class (Pluto, 1949).
6Marshall, Citizenship and social class (1949), p.29.
7D. King and J. Waldron, “Citizenship, social citizenship and the defense of welfare provision” (1988) 18 British
Journal of Political Science 415, 431.
8W. Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services (HMSO, 1942).
9 J. Clasen, A. Gould and J. Vincent, Voices Within and Without: Responses to Long-Term Unemployment in
Germany, Sweden and Britain (PolicyPress, 1998), p.87.
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As unemployment benefits were hardly earned through insurance contributions,
they became increasingly portrayed as handouts given to essentially passive welfare
recipients, encouraging the growth of what was classed as a “dependency culture”.10
The Conservatives resurrected the “actively” looking for work rule in 1989, when
“unemployed benefit claimants lost the right to refuse job offers based on low pay
after thirteen weeks of unemployment”.11 This represented to a large extent a
resurrection of the “genuinely seekingwork rule” for those claiming unemployment
benefits under the National Insurance Act 1921, when claimants were obliged to
accept any work paying a fair wage.12 The idea according to which poverty was
due to a lack of moral character, and that unemployment, save in exceptional
circumstances, was in effect sinful, had been a common theme throughout the 19th
century, especially under the Poor Law.13 It reappeared cyclically in the 20th
century, particularly at times of economic crisis and rising unemployment, as in
the 1920s and the late 1980s.
Each time, the rediscovery of “voluntary unemployment” was used as a moral
justification for the introduction of tougher labour market conditions and the
restriction of access to state social benefits. In the 1990s, this was couched in the
language of mutual obligations, under the rhetoric of a welfare contract, as
encapsulated by the reform of unemployment benefits and the introduction of
jobseeker’s allowance (JSA), which represented amajor step towards the unification
of working age benefits. In order to qualify for unemployment benefits claimants
had to sign a contract, the jobseeker’s agreement. The agreement encapsulated the
contractual approach to welfare, since each individual was committed to a pattern
of active jobseeking behaviour, the details of which were to accord with secondary
legislation. Benefit advisers could issue jobseekers’ directions that required
claimants to improve their employability. The parties to a jobseeker’s agreement
were the benefit recipient and the Employment Service, now Jobcentre Plus (JCP),
but it remained a contract in name only, since it did not encapsulate the “contractual
norms of consent and voluntariness”.14 Indeed, at the heart of JSA was a
fundamental imbalance of power between the Employment Service and the benefit
claimant.15
After some initial opposition to the scheme, Labour eventually endorsed JSA
and supported the contractual model of welfare based on mutual obligations
between the state and the beneficiary of social services. In 1997 the new Labour
10H. Trickey and R. Walker, “Steps to Compulsion Within British Labour Market Policies” in I. Lodemel and H.
Trickey (eds), An Offer You Can’t Refuse. Workfare in International Perspective (Policy Press, 2001); J. Clasen,
Reforming EuropeanWelfare States: Germany and the United KingdomCompared (Oxford: OUP, 2005); A. Daguerre,
Active Labour Market Policies and Welfare Reform: Europe and the US in Comparative Perspective (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007), pp.58–65.
11 J. Clasen, “The United Kingdom: Towards a Single Working-Age Benefit System” in J. Clasen and D. Clegg
(eds), Regulating the Risk of Unemployment: National Adaptations to Post-Industrial Labour Markets in Europe
(Oxford: OUP, 2011).
12L. Lundy, “Social Security and Employment” in N. Harris (ed.), Social Security Law in Context (Oxford: OUP,
2000), p.301.
13 P. Larkin, “The new Puritanism: the resurgence of contractarian citizenship in common law welfare states”
(2014) 41 J. Law & Soc. 227, 235.
14A. Eleveld, “The duty to work without a wage. a legal comparison between social assistance legislation in
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom” (2014) 16 E.J.S.S. 204, 219.
15 J. Fulbrook, “The Jobseekers Act 1995: consolidation with a sting of contractual compliance” (1995) 24 I.L.J.
395; Lundy, “Social Security and Employment” in Social Security Law in Context (2000), p.304; Eleveld, “The duty
to work without a wage: a legal comparison between Social assistance legislation in Germany, the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom” (2014) 16 E.J.S.S. 204, 219.
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Government pledged to rebuild the welfare state around work. The denunciation
of welfare dependency, the need to develop people’s employability through the
right balance of sticks (benefit sanctions in case of non-compliancewith programme
requirements) and carrots (work incentives) featured prominently on the legislative
agenda at that time. Under the new welfare contract, each individual had a duty
to take advantage of their human potential and to take up available opportunities.
The rapid integration of the unemployed into paid work was made possible by the
changing conditions in the labour market, namely the development of part-time,
flexible work, which provided opportunities for reforming the social security
system along the lines of a demanding conditionality regime centred on active job
search and backed up by benefit sanctions.
The rhetoric of rights and responsibilities was most clearly articulated under
Labour’s New Deal programmes. The New Deals entailed a combination of work
incentives, compulsory training and work-related programmes for young people
and the long-term unemployed, and use of benefit sanctions in case of
non-compliance with programme requirements.
Between 2001 and 2010, policymakers aimed at integrating all working age
claimants into the labour market, with benefit entitlement becoming increasingly
conditional on participating in work-related activities.16 A partial overhaul of the
benefit system resulted in the extension of work-related activities to new categories
of claimants, single parents and people with disabilities, who had been previously
exempted from work-related activities. The New Deal gradually involved the
implementation of a more stringent regime of work-related activities for incapacity
benefit (IB) claimants and single parents. In 2006, the Green Paper Empowering
People to Work17 set out the Government’s aspiration of achieving an employment
rate of 80 per cent of the working age population, with the targets of a reduction
by one million in the number of claimants of IB and helping 300,000 single parents
into work. To increase the numbers leaving IB and returning to work, the Green
Paper proposed the introduction of a new “employment and support allowance”
(ESA) from 2008, to replace IB. The Green Paper proposed a two-tiered system
that distinguished between severely disabled and temporarily unfit to work
individuals. New benefit claimants, except those with the most severe disabilities
and health conditions, would be required to participate in work-focused interviews,
produce action plans and engage in work-related activities, or see their benefit
level reduced. Non-compliance would result in benefits being reduced in slices,
ultimately to the level of JSA. The Green Paper proposals were included in the
Welfare Reform Bill 2006, which became an Act in May 2007.
The Welfare Reform Act 2007 restricted the coverage of income support and
IB in order to submit the vast majority of claimants to the more stringent
conditionality rules that traditionally applied to JSA. Many of the people who had
been previously considered to be outside the labour market and exempt fromwork
requirements (including people with an illness, disability, or care responsibility,
especially lone parents) were to be treated as part of the economically active
population. A work capability assessment (WCA) was used to determine eligibility
16Clasen, “The United Kingdom: Towards a Single Working-Age Benefit System” in Regulating the Risk of
Unemployment: National Adaptations to Post-Industrial Labour Markets in Europe (2011), p.22.
17DWP, A New Deal for Welfare: Empowering People to Work (HMSO,2006), Cm.6730.
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for ESA. A claimant could have three outcomes: if he or she was found fit for
work, the ESA claim closed and the claimant was moved to JSA (or could appeal
the decision); if the claimant was found to have limited capacity for work, he or
she was placed in the Work Related Activity Group (WRAG); finally, if the
claimant was found to have limited capability to work and in addition limited
capability for work-related activity he or she would be placed in the support group
and receive benefits on an unconditional basis.18
The Welfare Reform Act 2009 realised the vision of the Gregg Report,19
according to which conditionality should be extended to the vast majority of the
working age population so that virtually no one may claim benefits without taking
active steps to address their barriers to work. The legislation was couched in a
strong personal responsibility language with the key notion that there was a need
for a much clearer sanction regime for those who failed to attend an interview or
failed to sign on without a good reason.
These changes to entitlement rules were accompanied by an escalation of benefit
sanctions. Sanctions through loss of benefits had been in effect since the
introduction of JSA in 1996, when (as noted above) claimants could be denied up
to two weeks’ benefits or four weeks’ for repeat offences. But these sanctions were
applied through terminating the JSA claim, forcing the individuals to begin the
application process again, resulting in a high administrative cost for the DWP.20
The Welfare Reform Act 2009 intended to make the sanctions system more
consistent, automatic and escalating: missing a mandatory appointment resulted
in a benefit sanction of no less than one full week and subsequent failures in
two-week sanctions. The legislation also introduced new sanctions for JSA
claimants, notably in case of violence against Jobcentre Plus staff. The Act also
made provision for problem drug users, involving compulsion to declare a drug
problem and follow a rehabilitation plan.21 The Labour Government introduced
Welfare Reform Drug Recovery Pilots, but these pilots were cancelled by the
Coalition Government in 2010.22
In addition, the Act introduced compulsory “work for your benefit” (work or
work-related activity) schemes for long-term claimants of JSA, to be piloted from
November 2010. The Act allowed regulations to provide that claimants were
required to undertake “work, or work-related activity, during any prescribed period
with a view to improving their prospects of obtaining employment”. The
regulations23 allowed the Secretary of State to select claimants in pilot areas for
participation in the scheme if they met specified conditions. The explanatory
memorandum to the Work for Your Benefit Scheme (WfYB scheme) stated:
18OECD, Connecting People with Jobs. Activation Policies in the United Kingdom (July 15, 2014), p.169.
19 P. Gregg, Realising potential: a vision for personalised conditionality and support, DWP Independent Reports
(2008).
20N. Barker and S. Lamble, “From social security to individual responsibility: sanctions, conditionality and
punitiveness in the Welfare Reform Bill 2009: Part 1” (2009) 31 J. Soc. Wel. & Fam. L. 321, 325.
21Part 1 of Sch.3 to theWelfare ReformAct 2009 “makes provision for or in connection with imposing requirements
on claimants for a jobseeker’s allowance in cases where (a) they are dependent on, or have a propensity to misuse,
any drug, and (b) any such dependency or propensity is a factor affecting their prospects of obtaining or remaining
in work”. For a detailed analysis of the provisions related to problem drug users, see N. Harris, “Conditional rights,
benefit reform, and drug users: reducing dependency?” (2010) 37 J. Law & Soc. 233.
22DWP Press Release, Radical rethink on getting problem drug users back to work (June 17, 2010).
23 Jobseeker’s Allowance (Work for Your Benefit Pilot Scheme) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/1222).
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“the scheme will consist of work experience and job search support for up to
six months, delivered by organisations through contract with the DWP. This
aims to help those furthest from the labour market develop work habits and
routines, giving them experience of work in order to increase their
employability.”24
The scheme was aimed at the long-term unemployed, that is, individuals who had
been on the Flexible NewDeal (as the main welfare-to-work programme was now
called) for at least 12 months. It was couched in a relatively supportive language
for claimants, although failure to comply with the rules could lead to a referral for
a benefit sanction of up to 26 weeks.25
The official view was that there were plenty of jobs in all parts of the country
and that it was the responsibility of the unemployed to take up these opportunities,
a message that was reinforced in the mid-2000s26 by Secretaries of State for Work
and Pensions John Hutton MP (2005–2007) and James Purnell MP (2008–2009).
In a speech delivered in December 2006, John Hutton MP declared that there was
“a small group of benefit claimants without the major physical or health
barriers to work associated with Incapacity Benefit—who live in areas where
there is no shortage of vacancies, particularly for low-skilled jobs but who
nonetheless remain on benefits for long periods of time…Our welfare reform
must confront head on the ‘can work won’t work’ culture in our country.”27
Similarly, James Purnell MP declared in February 2008 that
“for the small number of people who refuse to take up the opportunities
available, we will be looking at howwe can develop a strict sanctions regime,
including either cuts in benefits or an option of permanent work for benefits
… if you can work you should work, and that will be a condition of getting
benefits.”28
This emphasis on the obligation to take up work as a condition of receiving benefits
echoed a speech made by the future PM David Cameron when describing the
Conservative welfare contract:
“We’re going to change the whole way welfare is done in this country so
everyone takes responsibility and plays their part. This is our new welfare
24Explanatory Notes to the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Work for Your Benefit Pilot Scheme) Regulations 2010.
25 In particular, the statutory instrument established “the range of acts or omissions for failing to participate in the
scheme that will result in a person losing their benefit or receiving it at a reduced rate. These include giving up a
place on the scheme, and failing to attend either the work experience or the job search element of the scheme. It
specifies the duration of such sanctions as 2 weeks for the first act, then 4 and 26 weeks for the second and subsequent
act within 12 months of a previous sanction. Following imposition of a 26-week sanction, JSAwill become repayable
when the person agrees to take part in the scheme, subject to a minimum of 4 weeks being served.” Explanatory
Notes to the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Work for Your Benefit Pilot Scheme) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/1222), p.3.
26House of Commons Education and Employment Committee, Employability and jobs: is there a jobs gap? (TSO,
2000), HC Paper No.60.
27 J. Hutton,Welfare Reform: 10 years on, 10 years ahead (December 18, 2006), Keynote speech delivered at an
IPPR North conference, Leeds, pp.18–19, http://www.ippr.org/uploadedFiles/events/ john_hutton_ippr.pdf.
28 J. Purnell, cited by S. Driver, “Work to be done? Welfare Reform from Blair to Brown” (2009) 30 Policy Studies
69, 77.
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contract: do the right thing and we will back you all the way. But fail to take
responsibility — and the free ride is over.”29
The Coalition Government’s narrative on benefit sanctions
The narrative of personal responsibility for people capable of working has grown
in the past decade, together with the idea that work is the best form of welfare.
Although the change of government in 2010 brought new policy and legislation,
there has been an underlying continuity in the “hard line” on long-term benefit
claimants taken by the Secretaries of State for Work and Pensions John Hutton
MP, James PurnellMP and Iain Duncan SmithMP (2010-present). Both the Labour
and Conservative Parties have promoted work-first active labour market
programmes based on the quick reintegration of benefit claimants into unsubsidised
employment.
The predominance of a work-first approach
Since the 1990s active labour market policies characterised by the emphasis on
relatively cheap employability measures combined with strict job search rules have
accompanied the adoption of deregulatory employment policies. This has resulted
in the creation of highly flexible, decentralised, localised and individualised labour
markets that provide a wide array of job opportunities in the service sector.30 An
aggressive work-first activation regime has been portrayed as sustaining strong
employment growth, including for people with low skills, due to the highly flexible
and diverse work patterns predominant in the labour market. In fact, it has been
suggested that
“the UK labour market has shown greater resilience than other countries
during and after the recession and that the combination of a ‘light and even’
employment regulation system and a successful activation regime has
contributed to this.”31
Post-1997 Labour Governments and the Conservative-led Coalition Government
thus pursued a similar strategy of increasing the supply of cheap, flexible labour.
To a large extent, welfare reforms post-2010 have simply strengthened the
predominant work-first logic where the focus is on strict job search, and where
there is less focus on more intensive—and costly—active labour market policy
interventions, such as training. Job-matching rather than up-skilling represents the
cornerstone of active labour market policies. In this context, the welfare-to-work
system is designed to condition and coerce benefit claimants into jobs through
tougher and more widespread benefit sanctions for those who are closest to the
29D. Cameron, “Ending the Free Ride For ThoseWho Fail to Take Responsibility” (Conservative Party, 2010)http:
//www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2010/04/Ending_the_free_ridefor_those_who_fail_to_take_responsibility
.aspx [Accessed October 16, 2015].
30 For instance, a report by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills states: “As well as having a very
dynamic labour market compared to other countries the UK also has one of the most diverse. The lack of regulation
on work patterns provides greater opportunity for businesses and workers to decide on types and patterns of work
that suit them”: Employment regulation, employment and growth: consideration of international evidence, https:/
/www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/34611/12-1147-employment-regulation-and
-growth-international-evidence.pdf, p.12 [Accessed October 16, 2015].
31Department for Business, Innovation and Skills,Employment regulation, employment and growth: consideration
of international evidence, p.13
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labour market (JSA claimants). This was the policy announced by the Conservative
manifesto in 2010. The manifesto stipulated that:
“Anyone on Jobseeker’s Allowance who refuses to join theWork Programme
will lose the right to claim out-of-work benefits until they do, while people
who refuse to accept reasonable job offers could forfeit their benefits for up
to three years.”32
Benefit sanctions and conditionality
The new policy framework for benefit sanctions was introduced by the 2010 Green
Paper, 21st Century Welfare, and the White Paper, Universal Credit: Welfare that
Works, and was consolidated in the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and subsequent
regulations.33Although the drive towards the adoption of a more stringent sanctions
regime had started well before 2010, there is a significant qualitative and
quantitative difference between the benefit sanction regime prior to 2010 and the
policy framework post-2012. The length of sanction periods was extended at the
end of 2012. The minimum sanction period increased from one week to four weeks
and the maximum from 26 weeks to three years. Higher level sanctions represent
a “very much more stringent sanctions regime than those previously applicable”.34
The new sanctions were applied to JSA claimants from October 2012. Under the
Welfare Reform Act 2012 changes were made to the Jobseekers Act 1995, with a
replacement s.19 and additional ss.19A, 19B and 19C. Section 19 provides for
higher level sanctions where the claimant fails to comply with the labour market
and employment-related conditions.35Higher level sanctions apply when a claimant:
• loses employment through misconduct;
• leaves work voluntarily;
• refuses to take up or apply for a job notified by the DWP;
• neglects to avail herself or himself of a reasonable chance of a job;
or
• fails to participate in a prescribed course.
A series of escalating sanctions applies:
• 13 weeks for the first failure; 26 weeks for a second failure within
52 weeks of a previous failure;
• three years for a third failure within 52 weeks of the most recent
failure.
The second set of sanctions is applied to claimants who fail to meet the conditions
in s.19A. These include where the claimant:
• fails to sign on as required;
• fails to attend an interview at the DWP when notified to do so;
• fails to participate in a prescribed course;
32Conservative Manifesto (2010), Invitation to join the government of Britain, p.15.
33DWP, 21st Century Welfare (TSO, 2010), Cm.7913; DWP, Universal Credit: Welfare that Works (TSO, 2010),
Cm.7957.
34 P. Wood et al., “Volume II, Income Support, Jobseeker’s Allowance, State Pension Credit and the Social Fund”
in David Bonner (ed.), Social Security and Legislation (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), p.93.
35M.Williams, “Sanction Busting—AppealingWork Programme Sanctions” (2012) 229Welfare Rights Bulletin.
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• fails to carry out a reasonable jobseeker’s direction; or
• fails to take up a training scheme or employment programme when
notified, gives up a place on such a course or programme without
good reason, or loses a place on such a course or programme due to
misconduct.
In practice, the Coalition Government clearly delivered on its promise to implement
a tougher sanction regime, with JSA sanctions reflected as a proportion of claimants
after reconsiderations and appeals having stabilised at 5.5 per cent and 6 per cent
of claimants per month in 2014 compared to an average of 2.2 per cent of claimants
between 2000 and 2006. There was an upward trend in JSA sanctions between
2007 and 2008 from 2.2 per cent to 3.5 per cent, followed by a sharp decline with
the start of the intense economic recession. JSA sanctions rates increased from 2.2
per cent in April 2010 to 4.3 per cent in December 2010, which corresponded with
the increased use of sanctions once the Coalition Government took office. This
was then followed by a sharp decline in JSA sanctions in 2011, when Work
Programme providers become responsible for monitoring JSA claimants. But
post-2011, and especially as a result of the implementation of the new sanctions
regime under the Welfare Reform Act 2012, JSA sanctions increased from a low
of 3.5 per cent in April 2012 to 5.8 per cent in December 2013, and have since
then been slightly decreasing, to 5.4 per cent in December 2014.36
Higher job search expectations have also been imposed on benefit recipients.
For instance, under the pre-2012 regime, JSA claimants could extend the period
during which they could restrict their job search to work their normal occupation
at a similar level of pay from three months to six months. This flexibility is no
longer available, and JSA claimants now have to take any job that pays at least
the minimum wage and is within 90 minutes of travel from their home, after three
months of unemployment.37 This disposition increases the pressure on individuals
to accept any employment offer even if the new job pays much less than the one
they held before becoming unemployed. In line with this work-first approach,
since autumn 2011 Work Programme participants38 undertaking training for up to
30 hours a week will remain on JSA and are thus subjected to the work availability
and work search rules. The keymessage is that JSA claimants must remain engaged
with the labour market.39
Finally, from September 2014, the Government started to roll out Universal
Credit (UC)40 nationally to new claims from single people who otherwise would
have claimed JSA. The numbers remain small: as of February 2015, 63,690
individuals had made a UC claim, with 31,030 people on the UC caseload.41 New
claimants have to sign a “claimant commitment”. According to theWelfare Reform
Act 2012, the claimant commitment “is a record of a claimant’s responsibilities
36 See D. Webster, Briefing: The DWP’s JSA/ESA sanctions statistics release (February 18, 2015).
37 Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/378), reg.14(3).
38TheWork Programme was announced in the 2010 Conservative manifesto and is essentially a revamped version
of the Flexible NewDeal, on a much larger scale and with the generalisation of employment and training programmes
being contracted out to private providers following a payment by results approach.
39European Social Fund,Work Programme Providers guidance, Training Allowance JSA claimants only (December
2014), pp.2–3.
40Universal Credit brings together the main working age benefits, i.e. Income-Based JSA, Income-Based ESA,
Income Support, child tax credits, working tax credits and housing benefits. As is well known, there have been
considerable delays and difficulties in rolling out UC nationally.
41DWP, Universal Credit — monthly experimental official statistics to February 2015.
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in relation to an award of universal credit”; “is to be prepared by the Secretary of
State, may be reviewed and updated as the Secretary of State thinks fit”; and “is
to be in such form as the Secretary of State thinks fit”.42 In general, the claimant
commitment includes an expectation that claimants will comply with a 35-hour
work search rule, although the DWP may agree a reduced time if claimants have
impairments or caring disabilities. The claimant commitment is part of the “cultural
transformation” introduced by UC, whereby jobseekers “will have to account more
clearly for their efforts to find work and will be given a weekly timetable of tasks
to complete”.43 The claimant commitment details the consequences in terms of
benefit sanctions if claimants “fail to comply with their responsibilities”.44
To a large extent, the Coalition Government was able to carry out the
implementation of a tougher benefit sanction regime for JSA claimants. In fact,
political opposition to the Welfare Reform Bill was stifled because the leadership
of the Labour Party was reluctant to be portrayed as soft on welfare in the context
of popular support for benefit sanctions. In addition, senior officials in the DWP
held the view that the demanding conditionality regime explained to a large extent
the strong labour market performance during and after the economic crisis from
2008. A senior civil servant in the DWP, who had been in charge of strengthening
the benefit sanctions regime since the late 2000s, said:
“One of the reasons, we think, that we’ve been really successful in this
recession is because we’ve been able to keep this regime going. So as well
as helping people to look for work we are being quite directive in making
them look for jobs because we are one of the only countries in the world in
recession who have managed to keep unemployment falling which we are
quite proud of.”45
Another senior official in the DWP, who had been advising ministers on labour
market policies since 2007, said that there had been a strong policy consensus in
favour of JSA, that JSA was viewed as an effective instrument for engaging
jobseekers:
“I think amongst officials one area where Treasury and DWP officials are in
general agreement is, as a general statement, for jobseekers, we are talking
about jobseekers here, that regime has been relatively cost effective in terms
of how much benefit you save for the amount of administrative time you put
in. So there is a starting point of agreement that having an active intervention
regime and requiring things of jobseekers is, as a general statement,
effective.”46
The same official also expressed the view that prior to 2012 not enough
requirements had been placed on jobseekers:
42Welfare Reform Act 2012 s.14, claimant commitment.
43DWP press release, Claimant commitment to spell out what jobseekers must do in return for benefits (August
29, 2013).
44DWP press release, Claimant commitment to spell out what jobseekers must do in return for benefits (August
29, 2013).
45 Interview DWP (January 2014).
46 Interview DWP (January 2014).
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“So speaking for myself personally and from some other DWP policy officials
I think there will be agreement that the amount that we might have required
of people two or three years ago was perhaps less than would be optimum.”47
A member of the SSAC also expressed a favourable view of the increased
expectations placed on JSA recipients as part of the claimant commitment:
“What I think is happening in the latest developments of policy and
particularly in the roll out of this Universal Credit programme and
conditionality that goes with it, a much used unfortunate phrase around ‘tough
love’ but as I go round and as a committee we do visits to front line offices
and seeing some very impressive examples of tough love … I’ve seen some
very good and positive examples of that where I think, in quite a tough way,
front line advisors really spotting what it is that needs to shift in this person
and giving them a lot of support but also making clear there is a deal here
and there are some significant sticks involved as well.”48
Perhaps just as importantly, not only were DWP officials confident that increased
conditionality and clearer sanctions were on the whole effective policies to enforce
compliance with job search requirements, there was also a strong sense that these
policies were popular; and opinion polls regularly confirmed the government’s
advantage in that regard. Indeed, the case for tougher benefit sanctions has been
widely accepted by the public.49 A member of the Work and Pensions Select
Committee explained that the Government was probably right when they said that
public opinion was on the side of benefit sanctions and that there was a general
sense of “unfairness” attached to the way in which the welfare system worked:
“I mean the government is not wrong when it says that public opinion appears
to be onside. I get it a lot from people who are not that well off or that far
away from the position themselves, they do say there is far too much spent
on benefits. They’ve usually got an example to give you which isn’t drawn
from the newspapers but is drawn from their own observations and
experience.”50
The notion that there was a “small minority of JSA claimants who were capable
of work but who refused to do so” was used as a rationale for tougher and longer
benefit sanctions, especially the higher level sanction of three years. This had been
a dominant theme in the Conservative Party policy proposals in the period
2008–2010.51 The Conservatives’Work for Welfare, for example, stated that
“While the majority of out of work benefit claimants would like to work if
they could, there is a significant minority who are playing the system.”52
47 Interview DWP (January 2014).
48 Interview SSAC (January 2014).
49 In fact, concerns about benefit dependency and welfare fraud had been rising between 2000 and 2007, with
widespread support for financial sanctions for single parents on benefits, as noted by J. Griggs, A. Hammond and R.
Walker, “Activation for all” in I. Lodemel and A. Moreira (eds), Activation or workfare? Governance and the
neo-liberal convergence (Oxford: OUP, 2014), pp.91–92.
50 Interview Select Committee Work and Pensions (January 2014).
51As observed by Peck, “the origins of workfarism, U.K. style, lie in the essentially negative conception of the
welfare scrounger” , J. Peck,Workfare States (Guildford: Guildford University Press, 2001), p.326.
52Conservative Party, Green Paper, Work for Welfare (2008), p.24.
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In his speech on the Welfare Reform Bill in February 2011, David Cameron
declared that the Bill was placing “some real responsibility on the unemployed to
ensure they try to get a job”:
“So if you’re unemployed and refuse to take either a reasonable job or to do
some work in your community in return for your unemployment benefit you
will lose your benefits for three months.
Do it again, you’ll lose it for 6 months.
Refuse a third time and you’ll lose your unemployment benefits for three
years.”53
In 2011, during the House of Commons debate introducing the Welfare Reform
Bill, Chris Grayling MP, then Minister for Employment, clearly subscribed to the
traditional Conservative view according to which a minority of benefit claimants
were “playing up” the system, which justified the adoption of a three-year benefit
sanction. The Shadow EmploymentMinister (LabourMP) Stephen Timmsmoved
an Opposition amendment to change the maximum sanction period from three
years to one year. Stephen Timms MP asked the Minister to explain what many
would consider a “pretty harsh proposal”.54
Chris Grayling MP stated that the higher level sanction was about sending a
message to people
“who have committed the most significant offence: those who refuse to apply
for jobs that they are suited to do; those who wilfully turn down job offers
and opportunities; and those who are referred to an activity as part of their
job search but systematically refuse to turn up — again and again and again.
There must be a point at which we turn round and say ‘No. That is not good
enough’.”55
A senior policy adviser in the DWP explained that the three-year sanctions were
discussed at length internally at the time but that Chris Grayling MP had stood by
his position:
“He didn’t expect many people to be sanctioned that long … So I suppose
from his perspective he would either say that is a sufficiently long time to
darn well make sure that if you’ve done it twice you ain’t gonna do it a third
time or if you do that must, in his view, indicate that as an individual you
don’t feel you need to rely on that benefit — for whatever reason that might
be.”56
Ministers felt emboldened by the fact that
“there was a lot of public support generally for tougher welfare reform and
tougher sanctions. So to that I can only really speculate whether ministers
53D. Cameron, Speech on Welfare Reform Bill, London (February 7, 2011).
54House of Commons Library Research Paper, 11/48 (June 8, 2011),Welfare Reform Bill: Committee Stage Report,
p.24.
55House of Commons Library Research Paper, 11/48 (June 8, 2011),Welfare Reform Bill: Committee Stage Report,
p.25.
56 Interview DWP1 (January 2014).
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feel like that has given them a stronger platform to do more, to be more
robust.”57
The British electorate has endorsed administrative and political elites’ messages
according to which some JSA claimants have a problematic attitude towards
employment.58
In this context, although there had been multiple calls for reviews of the benefit
sanctions regime between 2013 and 2015, ministers essentially ignored these
criticisms. There was, however, one exception to the rule: in March 2013, as the
Government needed the support of the Opposition to agree to the emergency
timetabling for the Back to Work Act 2013,59 it accepted setting up a review into
benefit sanctions. The terms of the review focused almost exclusively on the issue
of communication of JSA sanctions and whether claimants understood the reasons
why they had been penalised.60 In September 2013, the Government appointed
Matthew Oakley, a member of the SSAC, as the independent expert to conduct
the review into benefit sanctions.61
TheWork and Pensions Select Committee was critical of the terms of reference
of the review and recommended in its January 2014 report the establishment of a
second independent inquiry into benefit sanctions, stating in particular
“that the second review of sanctions investigate: whether sanction referrals
are being made appropriately, fairly and proportionately, in accordance with
the relevant Regulations and guidance, across the Jobcentre network; and the
link between sanctioning and benefit off-flow, including whether benefit
off-flow targets have an influence on sanctioning rates … We further
recommend that this review is launched as a matter of urgency and reports
before the end of 2014.”62
Ministers refused to conduct another review into benefit sanctions over and above
the Oakley Review, which they deemed sufficient. The Government, in its response
to the Work and Pensions Select Committee’s January 2014 report, wrote that the
Oakley Review was already under way and that they would “be publishing further
information on sanctions through the forthcomingWork Programme Evaluation”,
57 Interview DWP4 (March 2015).
58A. Dunn “Activation workers’ perceptions of their long-term unemployed clients’ attitudes towards employment”
(2013) 42 Journal of Social Policy 800.
59On Monday 18 March, the Shadow Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Liam Byrne MP, posted an article
on the website Labourlist.org: “Our young people need a real chance to work in a real job paying a real wage” “We
won’t be voting for a bill that is rammed through the House at lightning speed …What’s more I’ll be insisting on
crucial concessions to the Bill…Ministers must launch an independent review of the sanctions regime with an urgent
report to parliament.” Quoted in S. Kennedy et al., Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Bill 2012–13 (2013), House
of Commons Library, standard note SN06587, p.14.
60 In a press release issued on May 15, 2013, the DWP announced the setting up of an independent review into
benefit sanctions as the Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Act 2013 “requires the Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions to appoint an independent person to review the operation of sanctions validated by the Act. This review
will provide the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions with a report evaluating the operation of the provisions
relating to the imposition of benefit sanctions that are imposed as a result of, or have been validated by, the Jobseekers
(Back to Work Schemes) Act 2013.”
61M. Oakley, Independent review of the operations of Jobseekers Allowance Sanctions Validated under the
Jobseekers Act (London: DWP, 2014).
62Committee for Work and Pensions, The role of Jobcentre Plus in the reformed welfare system: Second Report
of Session 2013–14 (TSO, 2014), HC Paper No.479, p.105.
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and would “assess whether any further evaluation is needed once the current
evaluation programmes have concluded.”63 An interviewee in the DWP stated that
“there could have been a case made for going back and doing yet another
piece of work on Jobcentre Plus but actually ministers felt there was enough
evidence there from what we’d learnt from the Work Programme.”64
In March 2015, the Select Committee on Work and Pensions pointed out that the
Government had never conducted an evaluation of the impact of benefit sanctions:
in particular, the Committee wrote that experts had
“noted a lack of evidence that the application, or deterrent threat, of longer
sanction periods is any more effective than that of shorter ones.”65
The CoalitionGovernment was able to carry out most of its essentially Conservative
programme regarding financial sanctions for jobseekers. However, the
Government’s record wasmore mixed in relation to workfare schemes, as ministers
faced a series of political and legal challenges.
Workfare schemes: political and legal challenges
On workfare, or work-for-your-benefit schemes, the Conservative manifesto
document of 2010 declared:
“So, with the Conservatives, long-term benefit claimants who fail to find
work will be required to ‘work for the dole’ on community work
programmes.”66
In 2011 the Coalition Government introduced new WfYB schemes.67 The
Employment, Skills and Enterprise (ESE) scheme initially covered four initiatives:
(1) Skills Conditionality was aimed at improving the take-up of help and support
for those claimants with an identified skills need; Jobcentre Plus was to refer
claimants to a skills training provider; (2) Service Academies aimed to support
jobseekers who were close to the labour market but who would benefit from
participating in pre-employment training and work experience leading to a
guaranteed interview to help them move into sustained employment; (3) the New
Enterprise Allowance aimed to promote self-employment under the guidance of
a business mentor, providing access to a weekly financial allowance and business
start-up loan finance; and (4) theWork Programme provided back-to-work support
for a wide range of claimants, including JSA claimants, and claimants on ESA,
63Committee for Work and Pensions, The role of Jobcentre Plus in the reformed welfare system: Government
Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2013–14: Third Special Report of Session 2013–14 (TSO,
2014), HC Paper No.1210, p.9.
64 Interview DWP (March 2015).
65Work and Pensions Committee, Benefit sanctions policy beyond the Oakley review (TSO, 2015), HC Paper
No.814, p.21.
66Work and Pensions Committee, Benefit sanctions policy beyond the Oakley review (TSO, 2015), HC Paper
No.814, p.15.
67Jobseeker’s Allowance (MandatoryWorkActivity Scheme) Regulations (SI 2011/688), the Jobseeker’s Allowance
(Employment, Skills and Enterprise Scheme) Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/917), which replaced the Jobseeker’s
Allowance (Work for Your Benefit Pilot Scheme) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/1222), introduced as part of theWelfare
Reform Act 2009.
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income support and IB.68Mandatory Work Activity Regulations prescribed
mandatory work activity schemes, the purpose of which was to
“to target the small number of customers who do enough tomeet the conditions
of their claim while at the same time continually failing to demonstrate the
focus and discipline that is a key requirement of finding, securing and retaining
employment.”69
The language of the explanatory note made it clear that there was a minority of
JSA claimants who failed to engage with employers and who had neither the work
ethic nor the discipline that was required to find, secure and retain employment.
The SSAC had raised some important concerns concerning the
work-for-your-benefit regulations, both for the ESE scheme and covering
MandatoryWork Activity. Themain issues were related to the discretionary powers
left to JCP advisers andWork Programme providers and the fact that the Secretary
of State had very wide powers to mandate benefit claimants to participate inWfYB
schemes. The underlying assumption was that there was a risk that discretionary,
wide-ranging powers could be used in an arbitrary way. Regarding the ESE
Regulations, the SSAC was concerned about the principle of imposing
conditionality on Jobcentre Plus claimants who volunteered to participate in the
schemes. For the Service Academies, claimants could opt in to the scheme but
participation was mandatory from the point of referral; for the New Enterprise
Allowance (NEA), whilst the choice to participate was voluntary, participation
becamemandatory once a mentoring placement had been agreed.70 There was thus
an original ambiguity in policy design: the Government seemed to hesitate between
the principles of voluntary participation and compulsion. The fact that participation
in a scheme could be voluntary up to the point of referral, after which time it
became compulsory to participate, could also lead to some confusion in policy
implementation.
Under the Work Programme, private providers could decide to place people in
work-related activities such as work experience placements. TheWork Programme
was in most cases a mandatory programme: individuals aged 18–24 were to be
referred to the programme after the nine-month point of their claim, while those
aged 25 and over were to be placed on the programme after claiming JSA for 12
months.71 The SSAC expressed concerns
“about the breadth of the powers in draft regulation 3, which enable the
Secretary of State to select a claimant for participation in the scheme.”72
The SSAC raised four key objections to theMandatoryWork Activity Regulations.
First, they introduced a new set of conditionality requirements that amended the
body of case law regarding what “actively seeking work” actually means. Indeed,
68DWP, Report by the Social Security Advisory Committee and statement by the Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions The Jobseeker’s Allowance (Employment, Skills and Enterprise Scheme) Regulations 2011 (S.I.2011 No.917)
(TSO, 2011), Cm.8058, p.5.
69Explanatory Notes to the Mandatory Work Activity Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/688).
70 SSAC, The Jobseeker’s Allowance (Mandatory Work Activity Scheme) Regulations 2011 (S.I. 2011 No. 688):
report by the Social Security Advisory Committee (2011), p.33.
71A. Dar and C. Watson,Work experience schemes (March 9, 2015), House of Commons Library Standard Note,
p.7.
72 SSAC, The Jobseeker’s Allowance (Mandatory Work Activity Scheme) Regulations 2011 (S.I. 2011 No. 688):
report by the Social Security Advisory Committee (2011).
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it was assumed [author: assumed by whom?] that some claimants just “did enough”
to comply with the “actively looking for work” rule but in practice did not do
enough to find work. Secondly, the Committee noted that the Regulations failed
to describe the prescribed circumstances of a “good cause” for not complying;
there was some concern that discretion could lead to arbitrary decision-making.
Thirdly, the Committee had concerns regarding the proportionality of benefit
sanctions, as a failure to participate in a four-week programme could result in a
sanction of 13 weeks (three months) for the first failure. Fourthly, the Committee
noted the lack of guidance regarding expectations of contracted-out organisations
taking such placements (health and safety, type of work that the referred jobseeker
would be required to do), an approach that applied to the entire Work Programme
rules for employers contracted out under the scheme.73
The other work-for-your-benefit scheme was the Work Experience Scheme,
which was targeted at 18–24 year-olds with little or no experience of work. Young
people could participate in the scheme once they had been claiming JSA for 13
weeks. Work Experience Schemes started in January 2011. Participation was
voluntary at the point of entry but became compulsory after the individual began
his or her placement (see table 1 below).
Table 1. Main work-for-your-benefit schemes
Source: CESI, Government work experience schemes, what are the differences?http:
//www.cesi.org.uk/keypolicy/government-work-experience-schemes-what-are
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73 SSAC, The Jobseeker’s Allowance (Mandatory Work Activity Scheme) Regulations 2011 (S.I. 2011 No. 688):
report by the Social Security Advisory Committee (2011).
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The Coalition Government was faced with political and legal challenges in
relation to work-for-your-benefit schemes, mainly because they had been
assimilated with forced, unpaid labour.74 During the autumn of 2011, Shiv Malik,
a Guardian reporter, tried to find evidence of people working for free for
Sainsbury’s and other major retail stores under the government workfare
programmes:
“The Guardian put out a form asking people who had experience about
working in the government working schemes. Cait Reilly contacted us; I
wrote that up a few weeks later, there were a thousand comments. We put
her in touch with lawyers.”75
In autumn 2011, judicial review proceedings were brought byMs Reilly, who took
part in the “sector-based work academy” against her wishes, and JamiesonWilson,
who refused to participate in the Community Action Programme after he was told
that he had to clean furniture for 30 hours per week for six months without pay.
Wilson’s JSA was stopped for six months. The litigation proceedings coincided
with media pressure following protests organised by organisations such as Boycott
Workfare and Right toWork against work experience schemes. Indeed, the schemes
became unpopular as it transpired that big retail stores and chains could have
jobseekers work for them for free under the work experience scheme. On February
16, 2012 Tesco abandoned a job-for-benefit advert posted on the website of JCP
in Suffolk.76 Firms pulled out of the scheme partly for ethical reasons and partly
because it was bad for their corporate reputation. Although Iain Duncan Smith
MP publicly and forcibly defended the work experience scheme,77 it became
untenable to safeguard the original policy intention: which was clearly, in this
case, to compel jobseekers to participate. The DWP, under instructions fromChris
Grayling MP, amended the scheme so as to make it voluntary: this U-turn can be
interpreted as a loss of face for the Government. Indeed, a DWP source explained:
“Despite the best efforts, I think the team here were working with the
employers already on the Work Experience Scheme trying to shore them up
and give them confidence to try and stay with the scheme. The decision was
taken to make it completely voluntary so you can turn up, give it a couple of
days and if you don’t like it you can just pull out.”78
The media focused on Reilly’s claim, according to which work-for-your-benefit
schemes such as mandatory work activity or sector-based work academy could
constitute forced labour, but this claim was never taken seriously by the courts. In
August 2012 Foskett J held that the Secretary of State had failed to give Wilson
sufficiently detailed information about the consequences of a failure to participate
74For a detailed explanation of the protests regarding work experience schemes, see A. Daguerre and D. Etherington,
Workfare in 21st Century Britain (2014), pp.61–67, http://workfare.org.uk/images/uploads/docs/Workfare_in_21st
_century_Britain_Version_2.pdf [Accessed October 16, 2015].
75 Interview with S. Malik, Guardian (January 2014).
76BBC News, “Tesco drops job for benefit advert posted on website of Job Centre Plus in Suffolk” (February 16,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-suffolk-17066420 [Accessed October 16, 2015].
77 I. Duncan Smith, “Meanwhile, we are caught in a battle between those who think young people should work
only if they are able to secure their dream job, and those like myself who passionately believe that work in all shapes
and forms can be valuable, for it gives people a sense of purpose and opens up further opportunities.” “The Delusions
of X Factor and Sneering Job Snobs Who Betray the Young”, Daily Mail (February 20, 2012).
78 Interview DWP (January 2014).
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in the scheme and, in the case of Reilly, she did not receive any written notice at
all.79
The issue was whether the Regulations themselves were lawful, in as much as
they respected parliamentary intention in primary legislation. In February 2013
the Court of Appeal declared the ESE Regulations ultra vires80 because they failed
to describe in sufficient detail the schemes, as required by primary legislation.81
An implication of this decision was that the state was potentially liable for repaying
benefits unlawfully withheld from claimants. Ministers told civil servants that they
did not want to pay back sanctioned claimants, so their advice was to introduce
emergency legislation effectively to cancel the effects of the Court of Appeal
decision, as explained by one DWP interviewee:
“Their instruction was that they don’t want to repay any money and 100%
be as safe as possible and so we advised that the only way to do that is to pass
emergency legislation in that parliamentary session.”82
The Coalition Government’s case for retroactive legislation
Retrospective legislation is “legislation that operates on matters taking place before
its enactment, e.g. by penalizing conduct that was lawful when it occurred”.83 The
Minister for Welfare Reform, Lord Freud, argued that there was a compelling
reason to introduce retroactive legislation in the light of the court ruling, on three
grounds:
“first, the cost involved; secondly, the claimants affected do not deserve a
windfall payment; and, thirdly, this is an unusual case in social security
legislation where a court or tribunal decision has a retrospective effect.”84
To refer to the repayment of unlawful benefit sanctions as a windfall payment
shows that the objective was to send a clear political message to claimants that
they were not entitled to any compensation. The exact words of the Secretary of
State when addressing his opponent in the House of Commons were:
“if the Gentleman supports the idea that people who have been mandated to
do work, should take jobs and do work experience once they have volunteered
without messing around otherwise they lose their benefit, I hope that we can
look forward to his supporting the legislation that will ensure that we do not
have to pay out money against a judgment that we never anticipated.”85
In this speech, benefit claimants who were not complying with work requirements
were portrayed as “messing around”. What was also unusual in this case is that
79R. (on the application of Reilly) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2012] EWHC 2292 (Admin); (2012)
156(32) S.J.L.B. 31.
80R. (on the application of Reilly) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 66; [2013] 1
W.L.R. 2239.
81To simply name a scheme, as the Regulations did, meant that they failed the statutory requirement laid out in
primary legislation that the schemes must be prescribed in sufficient detail by the regulations, as explained by P.
Larkin, “A permanent blow to workfare in the United Kingdom or a temporary obstacle? Reilly andWilson v Secretary
of State for Work and Pensions” (2013) 20 J.S.S.L. 110.
82DWP interview (January 2014).
83E.A. Martin (ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Law, 4th edn (Oxford: 1997), p.406, cited by Standard Library Note,
Retrospective legislation (June 14, 2013), SN/PC/06454, p.2.
84Hansard, HL Vol.xxx, col.730 (March 21, 2013).
85Hansard, HC Vol.xxx, col.19 (March 11, 2013).
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ministers were adamant that they were not going to repay the claimants. In fact,
the DWP could have made a special case to cancel the adverse decisions, which
it chose not to, again on the basis of instructions from ministers:
“Perhaps operationally it probably would have been easier just to cancel the
decisions just to get rid of them all and certainly people in operations wanted
us to do that but in strategy there was no rationale for cancelling, for making
special allowances on these cases.”86
The Government argued that the retrospective legislation was needed to avoid a
liability of an estimated £130 million in repaying claimants who had been
sanctioned under the programmes and in being unable to impose sanctions
retrospectively in stockpiled cases.87 In the Government’s view, themain compelling
public interest argument was the cost to the public purse. The Government’s
argument was essentially flawed: as a result the legislation that was introduced—the
Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Act 2013—was vulnerable to criticisms,
according to which it violated the human rights of the claimants because it interfered
with their rights to a fair trial. Judicial review proceedings were brought on behalf
of Caitlin Reilly and Daniel Hewston (who was not a party in Reilly No.1) on the
ground that the 2013 Act was incompatible with their rights under art.6 of the
ECHR and art.1 of the First Protocol to the Convention (A1P1).88 The protection
of the right to a fair trial is at the heart of art.6 and is one of the most prolific areas
of litigation in the European Court of Human Rights. The claimants considered
that the Government’s statutory intervention in the ongoing legal proceedings was
affecting their right to a fair determination of their rights. In July 2014, the
Administrative Court found that although Parliament was not precluded from
adopting retrospective legislation in civil matters to affect rights arising from
existing laws, the principles of fair trial and equality of arms protected by art.6
“precludes any interference by the legislature…with the administration of justice
designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute”.89 Lang J criticised
the portrayal of JSA claimants affected by the retroactive legislation as receiving
an undeserved windfall when in fact “they are merely receiving their legal
entitlement”.90
The Reilly cases (1 and 2) arose out of an ideologically and politically driven
agenda put forward by ministers who did not want to be seen as backing down at
a time when the “tough on welfare” message was getting a lot of popular support.91
However, the fundamental government intention—to force unemployment benefits
claimants to participate in work-related activities—was not legally challenged,
because the courts always dismissed the claim that work-for-your-benefit schemes
were equivalent to forced labour as defined by art.4 of the ECHR.92 In fact, the
86DWP Interview (January 2014).
87Hansard, HC Vol.560, col.822 (March 19, 2013).
88R. (on the application of Reilly (No.2)) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] EWHC 2182 (Admin);
[2015] Q.B. 573.
89Reilly (No.2) [2014] EWHC 2182 (Admin); [2015] Q.B. 573 at [81] per Lang J.
90Reilly (No.2) [2014] EWHC 2182 (Admin); [2015] Q.B. 573 at [126] per Lang J.
91See C. Deeming “Foundations of theWorkfare State—Reflections on the Political Transformation of theWelfare
State in Britain”, Social Policy and Administration, article first published online (September 24, 2014), pp.17–18.
92See Larkin, “A permanent blow to workfare in the United Kingdom or a temporary obstacle? Reilly and Wilson
v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions” (2013) 20 J.S.S.L. 110.
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significance of “popular and legal resistance” to workfare should not be
overestimated.93
Conclusion
From the mid-1980s onwards, the UK social security system became increasingly
residual in nature, with the language of contracts pervading most areas of welfare,
as evidenced by the creation of JSA in 1995–96. It was also at this time that a
cross-party consensus emerged concerning the need to move away from a passive
welfare system based on entitlement to unemployment benefits—which, as we
have seen, had never been unconditional—to an active welfare model based on
responsibilities, encapsulated in the notion of the moral obligations of citizenship.
There has been a marked shift away from the duty of the state to support its citizens
towards the enforcement of a citizen’s obligation to participate in the labour
market.94 Under the new welfare contractualism,95 social rights can be understood
as consisting of rights of reasonable access to benefits, rather than unconditional
rights to welfare benefits as such.96 This new welfare contractualism became a
strong area of bipartisan consensus, not least because New Labour under Tony
Blair promoted a “work first” approach based on the active monitoring of
claimants.97 In this respect, social attitudes surveys suggest that “Labour supporters,
in particular, appear to have accepted the workfare line promoted by Labour under
Blair”.98
So what changed under the Coalition Government compared to the Labour
legacy? Five shifts can be identified that represent to a large extent both an
accentuation and acceleration of previous trends.
First, there has been a strong policy drive towards an increased use of financial
penalties for unemployed claimants portrayed as “undeserving”.99Despite recurrent
calls for public inquiries into the impact of benefit sanctions, the Coalition
Government was able to carry out its programme without much resistance mainly
because the electorate largely supported these policies. Indeed, public attitudes
towards the unemployed have considerably hardened, withmost people now “firmly
believing that JSA claimants could get a job if they really wanted one”.100 In this
context, the Coalition Government was able to portray harsher benefit sanctions
as essentially “fair”.
93Larkin, “A permanent blow to workfare in the United Kingdom or a temporary obstacle? Reilly and Wilson v
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions” (2013) 20 J.S.S.L. 110.
94Harris, “Conditional rights, benefit reform and drug users: reducing dependency?” (2010) 37 J. Law& Soc. 233,
236.
95 S. White, “Review Article: Social Rights and the Social Contract — Political Theory and the New Welfare
Politics” (2000) 30 British Journal of Political Science 507.
96White, “ReviewArticle: Social Rights and the Social Contract— Political Theory and the NewWelfare Politics”
(2000) 30 British Journal of Political Science 507; M. Freedland and D. King, “Contractual governance and illiberal
contracts: some problems of contractualism as an instrument of behaviour” (2003) 27 Camb. J. Econ. 465.
97The appointment of Frank FieldMP asWelfare ReformMinister in 1997 also signaled the symbolic shift towards
a more “active” welfare state. Of particular significance was the fact that changes to social security were now couched
in terms of welfare reform.
98Deeming, “Foundations of the Workfare State”, Social Policy and Administration, article first published online
(September 24, 2014), p.19.
99D. Webster, Evidence submitted to House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (December 12, 2014),
p.2.
100Deeming, “Foundations of the Workfare State”, Social Policy and Administration, article first published online
(September 24, 2014), p.18.
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Secondly, the Coalition Government used a divide-and-rule rhetoric along the
lines of the hard-working majority versus the minority living on welfare benefits
to justify both tougher benefit sanctions and the expansion of workfare schemes.
Although the divide between the “deserving” and the “undeserving” poor is a
classical theme in the history of social security, especially in the field of social
assistance and unemployment benefits, ministers devised a new theme around the
idea of “fairness to the taxpayer”. In particular, the notion that the “taxpayer”
directly pays jobseekers to look for employment and accept job offers has been
consistently used as a powerful rhetorical device to justify tougher benefit sanctions,
as spelled out by Iain Duncan Smith MP in May 2010:
“The jobseeker’s allowance has a sanction at present. It just has not been
used. If you simply are not going to play ball, then the taxpayer has a right
to say: ‘You need to know there is a limit to the amount of support we are
going to give you.’ The sanction comes into play.”101
This divisive rhetoric has also been used to justify the retroactive 2013 legislation
to avoid paying back JSA claimants who had been either referred for a JSA sanction
or sanctioned at a time when, prior to March 2013, the alleged failure to comply
with work-for-your-benefit schemes did not justify the suspension of JSA.
Thirdly, there is a strong moral judgment attached to benefit receipt, as the state
seeks to instil principles of good citizenship, such as self-sufficiency and the work
ethic. Neither the Work Programme, mandatory work activity scheme nor
community work placements significantly improve the chances of the long-term
unemployed to get back into the labour market102; instead, the focus of many of
these programmes, especially community work or mandatory work activities, is
on the duty to work without a wage.103 These placements represent obligations laid
on welfare recipients by the “community” to justify receipt of social assistance.
Fourthly, the goal of welfare reform under the Coalition Government is to
produce self-reliant, autonomous citizens, whose dependency on the public purse
can be reduced to a minimum. The idea is to foster “cultural change” to engineer
personal responsibility and self-sufficiency through the implementation of the
claimant commitment. The claimant commitment is in fact ill-defined, as it is
supposed to be an “iterative” document, a record of a conversation between work
coaches and claimants. Much emphasis has been put on the claimants and the work
coach “co-producing” the agreement as part of an “adult” conversation between
advisers and claimants, but a tremendous amount of discretion has been left to
advisers. There is therefore an inherent political ambiguity in the Government’s
plans, with a twin emphasis on personal responsibility and compliance.
Fifthly, work-for-your-benefit schemes tend to reintroduce the principle of less
eligibility, according to which benefits have to be far below the minimum wage,
so that only the destitute apply for poor relief—as expressed by the Royal
Commission on the Administration of the Poor Law in 1834:
101 P. Wintour, “Coalition government sets out radical welfare reforms”, Guardian (May 26, 2010).
102Research conducted by the DWP found that “Mandatory Work Activity referrals showed no employment
impacts”, DWP research, “Early impacts of Mandatory Work Activity” (June 2012), cited by A. Dar and C. Watson,
Work experience schemes, HoC Library standard note, p.5.
103Eleveld, “The duty to work without a wage. a legal comparison between social assistance legislation in Germany,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom” (2014) 16 E.J.S.S. 204, 215–219.
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“The first and most essential of all conditions is that the able bodied person’s
situation, on the whole, shall not be made really or apparently so eligible than
that of the independent labourer of the lowest class.”104
Of course, this is not to say that the schemes reproduce the conditions of the
workhouse.
The expansion of WfYB schemes has, however, been relatively limited,105 for
three main reasons.
First, there has been some political opposition to work experience schemes
targeted at unemployed youth, partially because of the strong ideological element
attached to this programme. Indeed, working class youth have been the primary
target of Conservative retrenchment efforts since the 1980s.105 This remains an
important political project for the Conservative Party. In 2008, the Shadow
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Chris Grayling MP, announced that a
future Tory government would bring in boot camps for unemployed young people
aged 18 to 21 who refused to take a job.106 These plans were shelved between 2010
and 2015, but reappeared in the Conservative Party manifesto in May 2015. The
manifesto announced the introduction of a time-limited youth allowance (six
months), “after which young people will have to take an apprenticeship, a
traineeship or do daily community work for their benefits”.107 The justification for
requiring young people to work for their benefits was framed in terms of “fairness
to the taxpayer”:
“it is not fair — on taxpayers, or on young people themselves — that 18-21
year-olds with no work experience should slip straight into a life on benefits
without first contributing to their community.”108
In August 2015, Matthew Hancock, chair of the government task force “Earn or
Learn” announced the creation of a new three-week intensive programme to get
claimants work-ready within six months. Young claimants will have to take a job,
apprenticeship, traineeship or unpaid work experience or lose benefits. The
objective of this policy is to “create a ‘no excuses’ culture to support youth
unemployment” and to “end the welfare culture that is embedded in some of
Britain’s most vulnerable communities”.109 It remains to be seen whether the
Government will be able to carry out its workfare policy for young people.
Secondly, work-for-your-benefit schemes have been subjected to the courts’
intense scrutiny, as shown by the legal challenges surrounding the relevant
regulations (Reilly No.1) and the Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Act 2013
(Reilly No.2). While there has been little media coverage regarding ongoing legal
proceedings, especially in relation to Reilly No.2, the fact remains that the High
Court issued a declaration of incompatibility with the ECHR concerning the 2013
104Quoted by A. Paz-Fuchs,Welfare to Work (Oxford: OUP, 2008), p.74.
105 See N. Harris, “Social security and the transition to adulthood” (1988) 17 Journal of Social Policy 501.
106D. Hencke, “Tories plan boot camps for jobless youth”, Guardian (May 26, 2008).
107Conservative Manifesto 2015, p.118 .
108Conservative Manifesto 2015, p.18.
109Cabinet Office press release, “Hancock: Every young person should be in earning or learning from April 2017”
(August 17, 2015).
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Act, at a time when only three declarations of incompatibility had been made
during the 2010–15 Parliament.110
Thirdly, the numbers of claimant participants inWfYB schemes have beenmuch
lower than the Government had anticipated. In relation toMandatoryWorkActivity,
while 251,200 referrals were made between May 2011 and August 2014, only
105,620 individuals had started a placement. Actual numbers of participants are
probably much lower, as placement starts once the individual attends an initial
interviewwith the placement provider.111 In relation to sector-basedwork academies,
169,330 claimants had started a placement between August 2011 and November
2014.112Again, numbers of actual participants are probably much lower. Moreover,
because providers administer the Work Programme under a payment-by-result
black box model, monitoring the performance of private contractors has proved
particularly difficult.113
To conclude, the expansion of workfare has been first and foremost rhetorical,
with relatively little in the form of “make-work workfare”,114, that is, strictly
speaking, work-for-your-benefit schemes. However, the Coalition Government
has been successful in terms of gathering strong popular support for the principle
of workfare, with the notion that access to social benefits should be limited to a
tiny minority of vulnerable claimants. Indeed, workfare forms part of a “discursive
struggle”115 in which social needs and concern for the disadvantaged have been
displaced by an emphasis on individual responsibility and the market. As a result,
exclusion from the world of paid employment is portrayed as a sign of moral or
psychological failure. To a large extent, because the three mainstream political
parties have subscribed to the idea of limited social support and personal
responsibility for individual well-being, as opposed to collective solidarity, the
Conservative-led Coalition Government has won the battle of ideas in the political
arena, at least for some years to come.
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